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Investment Decisions and Emissions Reductions:  





Emissions trading is an important regulatory tool in environmental policy making. 
Unfortunately the effectiveness of these regulations is difficult to measure in the field due to the 
unavailability of appropriate data.  In contrast, experiments in the laboratory can provide 
guidance to regulators and legislatures about the performance of different market features in 
emission trading programs. This paper reports on the implementation of three different 
institutional designs, and presents experimental results investigating important features of 
emissions trading regimes: the ability to make investments in emissions abatement, ability to 
bank allowances and a declining emissions cap, both with and without uncertainty.  These 
features are observed in virtually all existing air pollution emissions trading programs currently 
in place and will almost certainly be part of future applications. Like previous experimental 
studies of emissions trading, this paper shows that the efficiency gains expected from economic 
theory emerge observationally.  We also show reduced efficiency when permits are bankable due 
to over-banking and when investments in emissions abatement are possible due to over-
investing.  These tendencies do not worsen, however, when emissions caps decline. 
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1. Introduction 
Over the past several decades, emission trading has evolved from a suggestion by 
economists to a regulatory tool widely seen as highly successful  (Farrell and Lave 2004). 
Examples include the well-established sulfur dioxide allowance trading program in the United 
States and the just-emerging CO2 emission reduction credit program in Europe (Carlson et al. 
2000; Boemare and Quirion 2002).
1 Currently, emissions markets protect both human and 
ecosystem health, and in the process result in billions of dollars changing hands.  The application 
of emissions trading mechanisms will influence many decisions, including both operational (e.g., 
What fuel to purchase?) and investment choices (e.g., When to purchase abatement technology?).  
New patterns of investment may be among the most important outcomes of emission trading 
programs because massive investment in new technologies are likely to be needed to 
successfully deal with some environmental challenges, such as global warming (Hoffert et al. 
2002). Many of these capital investments are irreversible and very long-lived (electric power 
plants often operate for more than forty years), during which time regulations may change, 
creating uncertainty about optimal investment strategies. This paper uses an experimental 
economics approach to evaluate how individuals behave in emissions trading markets with 
opportunities for investment.   
  A well-known form of emission trading, and the form used in the experiments described 
below, is the cap-and-trade system, which, as the name implies, creates a permanent limit on 
emissions. In this system, the regulator defines the regulated sources and the total amount of 
pollution that can be emitted during a set period—the “cap.”  Typically, the cap is set in mass 
units (e.g., tons), is lower than historical emissions, and declines over time. The regulator creates 
allowances equal to the size of the cap and then distributes them to the regulated sources—a 
process called allocation.  The regulator then requires regulated firms to surrender emission 
                                                 
1 Similar market-based approaches have been taken for many environmental goals, not just abating air pollution. 
Examples include individual transferable quotas for fishing rights, tradable development rights for land use, and 
renewable portfolio standards (Boyd et al. (2003)., Hindsberger et al. (2003)).    4 
allowances equal to their emissions, on a periodic basis. Because the allocation to each firm is 
smaller than its previous emissions, regulated firms have four basic options: (1) control 
emissions to exactly match their allocation; (2) under-control and buy allowances to cover their 
emissions; (3) over-control and then sell their excess; or (4) over-control and bank allowances 
for use in future years (when even fewer allowances will be allocated). The reason firms might 
buy or sell allowances is that they often have different emission control costs, or they might 
change operations so that they need more (or fewer) allowances. Firms with higher costs could 
save money by under-controlling and buying allowances from those with lower costs, which 
could make money by over-controlling and selling allowances.  
Although emissions trading programs are motivated and justified by micro-economic 
concepts, there are variations in the specific situations they are called on to regulate, in the goals 
for the market and thus in the choices of market institutions and program design that must be 
made by regulators.  In this paper we examine the impacts of some of these market institutions 
and details on the performance of these markets using laboratory methods. A significant 
literature on the use of laboratory experiments to investigate emissions trading programs has 
developed over the last decade, summarized in Muller and Mestelman (1998) and Bohm (2003). 
Theoretical, modeling, and empirical approaches have been employed to evaluate various policy 
questions associated with emissions trading, but these approaches must either make strong 
assumptions about firm behavior or utilize the results of relatively scarce examples. Experiments 
provide useful supplements to field studies in illuminating questions about firm behavior in 
emissions markets that would be difficult or costly to achieve otherwise.  In contrast to empirical 
analyses, experimental studies allow careful control and measurement of efficiency and other 
theoretical constructs. In addition, experiments allow researchers to directly test hypotheses and 
testbed institutional changes that could not be done in the field.
2  
                                                 
2 Plott and Porter (1996). describe experimental testbedding as a method by which policy is initially implemented in 
a simple laboratory setting. If the policy does not work, or if it works but is not theoretically understandable then 
there is no reason to expect it to work in a more complex field setup.   5 
  This paper focuses on one methodological issue and three institutional features. In 
contrast to most of the papers in this area, we use an experimental design that describes emission 
permits in terms of its impact on production. This design is more intuitive and simpler to 
understand from the participants’ point of view. The three institutional features we examine are: 
banking of allowances, investment in abatement technology and uncertainty relating to permit 




  One particularly important decision is if and how allowances can be saved (or “banked”) 
from one period to another. Previous theoretical and experimental research has argued that 
banking has the potential to add efficiency by smoothing out the prices particularly in the initial 
periods when there is a lot of uncertainity about the market (Cronshaw and Brown-Kruse 1999, 
Godby et al. 1997 and Mestelman et al. 1999, Kling and Rubin 1997), but may need to be 
managed (Cason and Gangadharan 2005, Rubin 1996, Belanger 1997, Foster and Hahn 1995, 
Klier et al. 1997).
4   
Another important goal of emissions trading systems is to optimize investment in 
emissions controlling equipment. Emissions trading helps in managing transitions to lower-
emission production processes, which often require large, irreversible capital investments (Bohi 
and Burtraw 1992, Ben-David et al 1999, Fullerton et al. 1997). Emissions trading, banking and 
investment have a complex relationship.  Early investment in controls can produce surplus 
permits, which provides firms with the opportunity to sell allowances or to bank them for later 
use, when emissions constraints may be tighter (Bohi and Burtraw 1992, Ellerman 1996, Berman 
and Bui 1998, Montero and Ellerman 1998).  On the other hand, the ability to use allowances to 
defer an irreversible and potentially useless investment could also be valuable (Dixit and 
                                                 
3 Other researchers have examined additional features of these markets like market power (Godby 1999) and 
compliance (Murphy and Stranlund 2004). 
4 Cason and Gangadharan, 2005 in particular find that in treatments where subjects are given the option to bank 
allowances, emissions and non-compliance rates are significantly higher.   6 
Pindyck 1993, Chao and Wilson 1993).  The centrality and importance of the investment 
question to emissions trading motivates us to attempt to introduce the issue into the laboratory. 
Few previous studies have examined the impact of investment in abatement technology 
on emission markets in an experimental framework. Ben-David et al. (1999) provide subjects 
with a choice of three technologies and examine the impact of firm technological cost 
hetereogeneity on the operation of the permit market. They find that heterogeneity can lead to 
reduced trade volume and lower efficiency. Buckley et al. (2004) examine alternative approaches 
to emissions trading and test the prediction that capacity, emissions and output would be higher 
under variable baseline and credit trading than under cap and trade trading. Kusakawa and Saijo 
(2003) find that investment uncertainty could reduce efficiency in emission markets. In this 
paper we examine, in a simplified setting, whether emission markets encourage optimal 
investment and the extent to which such investment impacts market efficiencies.  In our 
experiment we make the information about investing in abatement technology public. We find 
that agents tend to overinvest in abatement equipment in our laboratory markets.   
An additional goal for emissions trading markets is to provide an equilibrating 
mechanism when conditions change.  The final market design we test therefore, is the ability of 
the market to react to uncertainty in the environment (Winebrake et al. 1995, Godby et al. 1997, 
Chao and Wilson 1993).  It has been argued that uncertainty and other factors such as transaction 
costs have prevented some emissions markets from working in the past (Hahn 1989, Foster and 
Hahn 1995).  Uncertainty comes in many forms, but one that seems especially salient is the 
potential for ever-tighter environmental regulations in the future.  In several of the most notable 
cases, progressively more stringent standards have been built into emissions markets (Fichthorn 
1991, Lents and Leyden 1996, Farrell 1999).   Additionally, the outcome from one emissions 
market can affect another.  For example, the introduction of CO2 regulation of some sort in the 
U.S. could influence the SO2 market because the relative prices for coal and natural gas (which 
contains much less sulfur than coal) could shift dramatically, reducing the demand for SO2   7 
allowances.  Although this could be a large effect, it is currently highly uncertain since the 
debate on CO2 control is nowhere near resolution.   
Ben-David et al. (2000) use laboratory techniques to explore the specific effects of 
uncertainty in tradable permit markets on prices, trading volume, firms’ ability to realize cost 
savings and invest in abatement technology. They focus on two types of uncertainty: uncertainty 
regarding the time at which the permit allocation will be reduced and uncertainty regarding the 
magnitude of the reduction and find that in the presence of uncertainty firms adopt a ‘wait and 
see’ approach towards investment. In several papers by Godby et al. (1997 and 1998), and one 
by Cronshaw and Brown-Kruse (1999) the impact of uncertainty and banking is examined, and 
while banking is found to have price stabilization features, it also has efficiency costs in this 
context. In addition, these studies showed that there was a tendency for participants to bank more 
allowances under uncertainty than would have been the case in equilibrium (overbanking). 
Cason et al. (1999) introduce declines in the allocation of emissions allowances over time in their 
experiment.  They find relatively low efficiencies in these markets when there is uncertainty, but 
suggest that the experimental design may have contributed to this problem. Cason and 
Gangadharan (2005) introduce uncertainty in the form of random correlated and uncorrelated 
shocks to the abatement and emissions target specified by the firms, which could occur due to 
unexpectedly low production or due to superior abatement equipment performance. They find 
that prices are more volatile after the emission shocks however banking helps in smoothing out 
the price volatility arising from the uncertainty over emissions. 
  Our experimental design compares market outcomes when emission standards are 
constant to outcomes when they will change in the future. In some treatments, subjects face a 
certain decline in allowances and in others the decline is uncertain. While overbanking is still 
observed in these treatments, it is less than in certain decline treatments. 
This paper extends the research efforts described above in two ways, first by developing 
a new experimental design to improve data collection and second, by developing experimental 
treatments to examine real-world interactions of investment, banking and uncertainty.  The   8 
different experimental design was motivated by concerns that increasingly complex treatments 
could overwhelm participants in emissions market experiments, who have limited time and 
attention to spend on the exercise.  In addition, existing experiments tend to overemphasize the 
emissions market at the expense of the underlying product market.  Firms in emissions markets 
are primarily motivated by forces in their product markets (e.g. electricity), and are beginning to 
see emissions allowances as just another input with its own markets just like other inputs to 
production, such as fuel (Farrell 1999).  Thus we sought to describe the emissions market in 
terms of its impact on the production market in a way that was context-free and largely masked 
the fact that environmental policy was involved, while still conducting an experiment in 
emissions trading.  The resulting design is described in the next section.  We find that this 
method though simpler, yields similar results as the other papers in the field. 
Often papers in this literature examine one institutional feature in isolation. In the field 
however market participants and regulators are interested in the performance of emission 
markets in the presence of these features simultaneously. This paper contributes to this literature 
by studying the interaction of banking and investment and banking and uncertainty and their 
impact on market outcomes. For example, we find that in sessions where we allow for 
investment and banking the proportion of permits “over banked” is reduced relative to treatments 
where we allow only banking. This suggests that overbanking may be less of a problem in the 
world (where investments are presumably possible) than in the laboratory (where they frequently 
are not). 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the experimental design, 
section 3 outlines the theoretical predictions. Section 4 presents the results and Section 5 
concludes.  
2. Methodology 
The experimental economics methodology has proven to be a powerful tool in advancing 
our understanding of how people make decisions in economic or strategic environments.  Our   9 
experimental design and procedures were informed by previous research not only in the area of 
emissions trading but also in the area of experimental markets more generally.
5   
2.1 Experimental Design 
While previous experiments have examined the impact of emissions trading in terms of 
abatement, holding the output (e.g. the quantity of electricity produced) fixed and examining the 
impact of markets on pollution emitted, in our experiment we approach the question from the 
opposite direction.  The experimental design we use holds the amount of pollution produced 
fixed and varies the quantity of output produced.  We do this by fixing the number of allowances 
available, but varying the earnings each firm receives from using an allowance to simulate 
greater production possibilities by cleaner plants.  The advantage of this approach is that the 
market can be described in a way that is particularly accessible to participants, and in a way that 
was free from the context of environmental policy.  This approach can be motivated by 
considering an electricity sector that contains both very clean (e.g. gas-fired or renewable) and 
heterogeneously dirty (e.g. coal-fired) generation and assuming that the latter have lower 
marginal production costs. The participants in our experiment represent only the latter, and work 
within the constraints of the emissions cap (masked in our design) to maximize profit by 
producing electricity and trading allowances. If demand does not change, any increase in 
electricity generated by the participants is assumed to be offset by less electricity being generated 
by the very clean units that do not participate in the emissions trading market.  
Theoretically these different approaches should yield identical results.  Both measure the 
extent to which emissions permit trading improves the efficiency with which output is produced.  
However, empirically they may not.  Thus a methodological contribution of our paper is to 
provide a robustness check on efficiency and other results reported by previous experiments. 
                                                 
5 Experiments have been used to study decision-making in areas as diverse as markets, the voluntary 
provision of public goods, voting and bidding in online auctions. Davis and Holt (1994) and Kagel and Roth (1995) 
provide excellent overviews of the methodology and research produced in this area.   10 
Participants in our experiment trade in a double auction market for a series of periods 
called markets. The double auction trading institution is widely used; all parties have equal 
bargaining power, it performs efficiently even with a small number of traders (Smith 1962, 
Smith and Williams 1992), and it best captures the naturally-occuring emissions trading markets.  
Subjects were given a set of instructions that were read aloud to create common knowledge 
(appendix A contains sample instructions).  In these instructions subjects were told that they 
represent a firm producing a good called a widget.  To the subject, a widget was conceived of as 
a physical good; however for purposes of this discussion, a widget should be thought of as the 
amount of output (e.g. electricity) a given firm can produce while releasing one unit of 
pollutants.  Firms are heterogeneous in our experiments, thus the amount of output a firm can 
produce (the value of the widget) while emitting one unit of pollutants is higher for cleaner firms 
and lower for dirtier firms. 
This heterogeneity is captured in the experiment by assigning some firms a higher profit 
per widget than others (those are the cleaner firms who are producing more output per unit of 
pollutant released).  The conceptual model behind this heterogeneity involves a competitive 
market for output, where each unit of output is sold for a normalized price of $1.  For each unit 
of pollutant released, cleaner firms produce more output than dirtier firms.  Thus for each unit of 
pollutant released, cleaner firms earn more than dirtier firms.  So the cleanest firm’s profit from a 
widget (that is, from the amount of output it is able to produce while releasing one unit of 
pollutant) was $10 while the dirtiest firm’s profit was only $5. 
Once the basic idea of widget sales is understood, participants are then told their capacity 
for widgets (corresponding to their capacity for output production).  They are also told that the 
government requires firms to have a license before they can produce widgets.  Firms receive 
some licenses from the government, and can buy extra licenses or sell all or some of their given 
licenses on that market.  These licenses correspond to emissions allowances or permits which are 
licenses to release one unit of pollutant.   11 
Table 1 describes the experimental parameters we use.  For the present discussion we will 
focus only on the parameters in bold text.  We constructed six types of firms, differing in their 
cleanliness and size. The first row of Table 1 describes the number of permits per period the 
government allocates to each type of firm. We assumed that government allocations of permits to 
firms would follow the typical practice of a grandfathering policy, allocating more pollution 
permits to the dirtiest firms.  The second row describes the value of the permit to each firm.  The 
third row describes each firm’s capacity in terms of permits, while the last row translates that 
capacity into our assumptions about capacity in production of electricity.  We assume that dirtier 
firms have higher capacity for electricity production (with some variations to allow the numbers 
to divide evenly).   
<Table 1 about here> 
Participants in the experiment are told they may not sell short (sell more permits than 
they have) and that unused permits will expire at the end of the period.  They are told there will 
be more than one period, but not told exactly the number of repetitions to expect (in order to 
avoid endgame effects). Subjects were compensated based on their firm’s profitability, including 
both profits from production and profits from trading permits. 
2.2 Measuring Market Efficiency  
We will examine two types of market efficiency measures.  The first is a measure of the 
trading efficiency of the permit market in its role as a market.  That is, how much of the available 
surplus from trading is realized?  This measure will be the one typically used in market 
experiments (Holt 1995).   
For example, imagine a market with six firms in it, one of each type from Table 1.  If the 
market is efficient, dirty firms who value the permits less should sell them to clean firms who 
value the permits more.  This will create gains from trade.  However, the cleaner firms should 
not buy all the permits that dirty firms might be able to offer because the capacity constraints of 
the clean firms would prevent them from using all available permits (the cleanest firm can only 
use 5 permits, it is given 1 permit, thus it only demands at most 4 permits, while the dirtiest firm   12 
has 6 permits to sell).  Figure 1 depicts the supply and demand curve from such a market taking 
these capacity constraints into account.  The maximum trading surplus which could be generated 
is $270.  Our measure of trading efficiency will involve calculating the maximum possible 
trading surplus for each market, calculating the actual surplus earned from trading, and reporting 
trading efficiency as the ratio of the two. 
<Figure 1 about here> 
Our second measure of efficiency is a measure of productive efficiency.  This measure 
captures the extent to which electricity is produced in the most efficient manner (by the cleanest 
firms).  For this measure, we will report the number of units of output produced.  Remember that 
while previous papers have held the amount of output produced constant and examined the 
impact of markets on the amount of pollution released, our experiment does the reverse.  Since 
we control the number of pollution permits released into the economy, reporting pollution 
produced would not be informative.  Instead, we report the amount of output (electricity) 
produced for a given level of pollution.  When cleaner firms are producing (and polluting), the 
amount of output produced for a given amount of pollution should be higher than when dirtier 
firms are producing.  In addition to reporting the absolute amount of output produced, we will 
report the fraction of the output produced in this market relative to the amount that would be 
produced in equilibrium.   
2.3 Treatments  
Since our research was motivated by the effects of market institutions on emissions 
permit markets and on investment behavior, our experimental design involves comparing prices, 
trading and production efficiency in treatments representing different market rules, including the 
possibility for investment in emissions control equipment (which in our design appears as 
investments in efficiency-enhancing capital) and uncertainty about the future supply of permits.  
The experimental design is presented in Figure 2 below with circles representing the different 
treatments and lines representing the comparisons of interest. In all treatments, subjects trade in a 
number of periods, but do not know when the session would end. After each period, we   13 
randomly choose a number between 1 and 100 and if the number chosen is between 1 and 20 the 
session would end. 
<Figure 2 about here> 
Trading only (baseline)  
The first treatment, baseline, is as described above.  Participants trade in the market, then 
produce given the permits they have and their capacity constraints.  Permits expire before the 
next period.  Trading and production efficiency measures are calculated as above.  36 subjects 
participated, 6 subjects of each type, in this treatment and we collected data from 4 periods. 
Banking 
The second treatment, banking, investigates the impact of allowing firms to bank (save) 
their permits period-to-period.  33 subjects participated in this treatment for 6 periods. This 
treatment is identical to the baseline with the exception that after the period, firms can choose to 
use their permits to produce or save them for the next period.  In the current experimental context 
where each period is simply a replication of the one before, the equilibrium prediction is that 
there should be no banking.  
The banking treatments also provide some special challenges for the calculation of 
trading and production efficiency.  To illustrate this difficulty with an example, consider a firm 
of type 2 with a capacity constraint of seven permits (63 units of electricity).  In the first period 
they are given 2 permits, imagine that they purchase six more (one more permit than they can use 
given their capacity constraints).  They use seven permits for production and bank (save) one.  
Now, two complications arise. 
First, when calculating the trading surplus from the period, how should we assume the 
firm values that superoptimal permit?  Three alternatives suggest themselves.  First, the permit 
could be valued at the value for permits for that firm (in this example $9), even though it is not 
being used for production (and indeed, may never be used for production).  This alternative 
overstates the actual trading surplus created, and thus overstates the trading efficiency of the 
market.  Second, the permit could be valued at zero, since it is not being used for production by   14 
the purchasing firm.  This alternative understates the actual trading surplus created, and thus 
understates the trading efficiency of the market.  Finally, the permit could be valued at the price 
paid (for this option we assume the cheapest permit purchased is the inframarginal one).  This 
would generate zero surplus for the purchaser of the permit (although positive surplus for the 
seller) and represents a middle ground.  We will present all three calculations for the banking 
treatment to provide the reader with an understanding of how the choice affects reported 
efficiencies.  For the remainder of the treatments, only the third value (based on the market price) 
will be used.   
The second complication involves calculating the next period’s equilibrium prediction.  
Since the extra permit was banked, the market in the next period has an extra unit of supply (and 
one fewer unit of demand) than the first market did.  Thus in all the remaining periods the 
equilibrium prediction (market price and quantity, theoretical trading surplus and theoretical 
production surplus) changes from period to period.  When reporting trading and production 
efficiency measures below we will take this into account, recalculating the equilibrium 
prediction of these measures for each period. 
Investment 
The third treatment (directly below banking in Figure 2) allows both banking and 
investment.  28 subjects participated for 6 periods in this treatment. Instructions were the same as 
the banking treatment with one addition.  Firms could choose to spend 80 experimental dollars to 
make an investment in their plant.  Firms which made this investment were assumed to upgrade 
their plant’s equipment, enabling them to produce more electricity for the same amount of 
pollution emitted.  Thus the investment increased their value for a widget. The investment was 
described in the instructions as a process improvement, increasing their profits for each widget 
sold. This is one of the first few papers to examine the interaction of investment decisions and 
market outcomes. 
The regular text rows of Table 1 labeled “when investment” denote the impact on each 
type of firm of making this investment.  Notice that the impact of investment is asymmetric;   15 
dirty firms have much more to gain by upgrading their plant (increasing their electricity 
production for each unit of pollution released from 5 to 9) while the improvement on the part of 
clean firms is more modest.  In order to retain the (approximate) electricity production capacities 
in the bottom row, investment also influences the firm’s capacity for widgets.  Importantly, we 
are thus assuming that investment increases firm cleanliness but not its capacity for making 
electricity. 
Optimal investment behavior is straightforward to calculate.  First, since investment is a 
one-time decision yielding future benefits, if a firm is going to invest it should do so in the first 
period.  Additionally, the cost of investment was set strategically so that if the market were at 
equilibrium only a subset of firms would choose to invest.  Finally, information about investment 
decisions was announced publicly during each period of the experiment.  
Just as the existence of banking leads us to rethink our measure of trading efficiency, the 
investment option leads us to extend our measure of productive efficiency. In particular, when 
investment is available, the total possible productive efficiency (that is, the maximum amount of 
electricity that can be produced by this market for a given level of pollution) will vary by the 
number of firms investing in emission controls. If more firms invest, plants overall will be 
cleaner and the market as a whole can produce more electricity for a given level of pollution. 
We can adjust our benchmark of expected productive efficiency to incorporate changes 
caused by investment in two ways. First, we can calculate the total possible productive efficiency 
we would expect under equilibrium investment behavior. We would then compare the actual 
productive efficiency to this benchmark. The disadvantage of this benchmark measure is that it 
makes these markets look more efficient than they are (especially since it does not account for 
the cost of the investment). The advantage is that presents a more accurate comparison between 
the treatments. When investment is an option, the market produces much more electricity for a 
given level of pollution than when investment is not an option. 
 Second, we can calculate the benchmark of total possible productive efficiency given 
actual (not equilibrium) investment behavior. This more appropriately captures the concept of   16 
productive efficiency by answering the question: for a given distribution of cleanliness of firms, 
are they producing efficiently? The disadvantage is that the comparison between the treatments 
is less clear. We may end up with a lower productive efficiency measure in this treatment than in 
another, even though this market is more productively efficient (producing more electricity per 
unit of pollution released).  We will report both measures in our analysis below.  
Certain Decline 
The fourth and fifth treatments (to the right of banking in Figure 2) investigate the impact 
of decreasing the number of pollution permits in the marketplace, as happened (or will happen) 
in many emissions markets. The fourth treatment examines the case where this decrease is 
known (as in Cason et al. 1999) and the fifth, where it is unknown.  In both treatments, the 
decline in permit allocations is as shown in Table 1, in the regular text row titled “when 
declining.”  In these treatments, banking is permitted but there is no investment option, as can be 
seen in the experimental design of Figure 2. 
In the fourth treatment, this decline is anticipated and known to the subjects.  Instructions 
are as in the banking treatment, but subjects are told that after the second period all permit 
allocations from the government will decline.  Subjects are told how their own permit allocations 
will change, as well as the change in total permits available in the market.  They are not told, 
however, how the distribution of permits will change. 
The anticipated decline in permit allocations provides a reason for saving (banking) 
permits.  In particular, if subjects had rational expectations, exactly enough permits would be 
banked in order to make the profit from selling or using a permit the same in all periods, thus 
predicting the same market prices over time. 31 subjects participated in 5 periods in this 
treatment. 
Uncertain Decline   
In the fifth treatment, uncertain decline, subjects are told only that the number of permits 
they receive could decline after the second period (and that the total number of permits in the 
market will decline) but not by exactly how much. They were told that they would never receive   17 
less than 50% of their original allocation.
6 This treatment (with 40 subjects participating in 5 
periods) represents perhaps the most realistic case of capturing market uncertainty in emissions 
permit markets since there is a tendency towards higher and higher environmental standards.  
The addition of uncertainty makes theoretical benchmarks for this treatment difficult, as each 
subject’s optimal response depends on their beliefs about the future drop in permits.  That said, 
we can make some qualitative predictions describing equilibrium behavior, which we do in the 
next subsection. 
3. Theoretical Benchmarks 
Table 2 describes the theoretical benchmarks we have calculated and will be using to 
compare with outcomes for each treatment.  The table incorporates factors like the number of 
experimental subjects who participated in each treatment as well as the number of permits 
offered and saved (banked) in each period.  For the baseline treatment, this number of permits is 
constant for all periods, for the other treatments, the number of permits available depends on the 
number that were saved (banked) by the subjects, and thus changes period to period. 
<Table 2 about here> 
The table also describes the equilibrium price and quantity in each treatment in each 
period.  As mentioned above, the market equilibrium in all treatments but the baseline change in 
each period, due to banking activities by the players.  As in all discrete market settings, these 
numbers are often ranges rather than point predictions.  The equilibrium trading efficiency is the 
maximum trading efficiency possible given the number and distribution of permits in each 
treatment in each period.  Our results will report actual trading efficiency (surplus created by 
trades) as a percentage of this optimal amount. 
The final three lines of the table describe equilibrium productive efficiency.  These are 
the number of units of electricity which could have been produced given the permits used (the 
amount of pollution released) had only the most efficient firms produced, taking into account 
                                                 
6 In the treatments in Ben-David et al. (2000), the reduction in the number of permits was 35% or 45% of the 
original allocation.     18 
capacity constraints.  The second and third measures of productive efficiency are calculated for 
the investment treatment.  They involve an identical calculation either for the optimal investment 
behavior (described below) or for the observed investment behavior. 
The remaining theoretical benchmark involves optimal investment behavior.  The 
parameters were set such that only type 4 firms had the incentive to invest in cleaning up their 
plants. Appendix A provides a description of the equilibrium.  Intuitively, firms of type 1 and 2 
are not improved enough by the investment to make it worth paying for (they earn at most an 
extra $55 worth of profit over the (expected) five periods, not recovering their $80 investment 
expenditure).  Firms of type 5 and 6 earn more by selling their endowment of permits than they 
could by investing and producing (the increase in their profits from investing and producing is at 
most $30 over the expected five periods).  Firms of type 3 earn more by investing and producing 
than by not investing and still producing, but not enough to overcome the cost of investing 
(earning $50 over the expected five periods versus $80 to invest).  Only firms of type 4 earn 
enough by investing to overcome the costs ($135 over the expected five periods versus $80 to 
invest).  Thus we assume firms of type 4 invest and all others do not in our calculation of the 
measure of benchmark productive efficiency. 




We report the results for each treatment comparing how the outcomes measures perform 
with respect to the theoretical predictions. Then we compare the treatments with each other to 
examine if some design features yield higher efficiencies absolutely and relative to their 
equilibrium predictions.  
Trading only (baseline)  
Table 3 depicts the experimental results from the baseline treatment, in each period and 
averaged over the periods.  Average price was a bit higher, and quantity a bit lower, than   19 
predicted by equilibrium analysis.  This suggests that subjects did not make all the pareto-
improving trades that they could have made.  Consistent with this observation, we see 
suboptimal surplus earned from trading.  However, productive efficiency was relatively high. 
In the theoretical benchmark, the three dirtiest firm types should sell their permits to the 
three cleanest firm types.  Closer inspection of the data indicate that these dirtiest firms were not 
entirely selling (although they were indeed net suppliers).  In particular, the percentage of the 
permits used for production by the three dirtiest firm types in each period was 40%, 27%, 24% 
and 20%.  That this proportion decreases over time suggests that these firms were learning that 
they earned more by selling their permits than by keeping them and producing.  Figure 3 depicts 
the percentage of permits used by each type of firm in all of the treatments, along with the 
distribution which would be expected under full productive efficiency. 
<Table 3 about here>  
As in other experiments, results from this baseline treatment show high production 
efficiency compared to the theoretical benchmark.  The next subsections investigate institutional 
designs which may further improve efficiency of the market. 
Banking 
Table 4 depicts the experimental results from the banking treatment, in each period and 
averaged over the periods.  As in the baseline condition, the average price is higher than the 
equilibrium prediction and the quantity lower.  However, in contrast to the baseline, this is not 
due to dirty firms choosing to produce inefficiently.  Instead it is due to superoptimal banking of 
permits.  Since the supply and demand of permits remained constant in this treatment in 
equilibrium no permits should be banked.  Instead we observed more permits banked than used 
in all periods except the last (rows three and four of Table 4).  This excessive banking made our 
measure of trading surplus extremely sensitive to how we valued these banked permits.  The 
third measure (the one we use for the remainder of the treatments) values permits purchased for 
the sole purpose of banking at their cost, does not incorporate those transactions into the measure 
of trading surplus and is thus most comparable with previous and future treatments.  Using this   20 
measure we see no significant difference in trading efficiency between this and the baseline 
treatment (probability value of a pairwise t-test which determines the difference in means, across 
treatments =0.30).
7  However, we see significantly higher productive efficiency measures in this 
than in the baseline treatment (probability value =0.05).  The addition of an alternative use for 
permits (saving them to be sold in the future) seems to have prevented the dirtiest firms from 
using their permits for production.  This can be seen graphically in Figure 3 by comparing the 
percentage of permits used by the dirtiest firms in the baseline and banking treatments. 
<Table 4 about here> 
These results suggest that the institution of banking permits does not hurt and may help 
trading and productive efficiency.  However, they also indicate a potential for overbanking, 
which suggests that permits with shorter lifespan might be more effective than those that are 
valid indefinitely. 
Investment  
In our next treatment we examined the efficiency of the emissions market when firms had 
the opportunity to invest in cleaning up their plant and when permits were bankable.  First, we 
continue to see the overbanking of permits as in the previous treatment.  However, we also 
observe significant overinvestment.  As mentioned before, the parameters were set such that only 
type 4 firms had the incentive to invest in cleaning up their plants.  Instead we observed firms of 
all types investing; 17 out of 28 firms invested (61%) all but two at the first opportunity.  This 
overinvestment is reflected in higher prices (and lower quantities) than predicted by equilibrium, 
as well as in lower trading efficiencies than in previous treatments (t-tests and the Wilcoxon’s 
rank-sum tests show that trading efficiency is significantly lower in this treatment as compared to 
the banking and the baseline treatments), reported in Table 5. Subjects in this treatment achieved 
higher productive efficiencies due to the increased investment.  The productive efficiencies in 
smaller font incorporate the costs of investing, when actual investments are taken into account 
                                                 
7 We also conducted non-parametric Wilcoxon Rank-Sum tests of differences in distributions across treatments. The 
results are similar to the t-tests.    21 
the productive efficiencies are lower in this treatment than in the banking treatment, however the 
difference is not statistically significant. The lower productive efficiency could be in part driven 
by the shorter number of periods the firms had in order to recoup their investment expenditures. 
<Table 5 about here> 
These results suggest that allowing firms to invest in cleaning up their plants has two 
effects.  First, the proportion of permits banked decreases somewhat, although it does not 
decrease to its equilibrium level of zero.  Second, firms overinvest, yielding high productive 
efficiencies but spending more than is socially optimal on investment.  Dirtier firms invest in 
cleaning up, then produce in place of firms which were originally clean, so that investment costs 
become socially wasteful.  This result highlights a possible danger with tradable emissions 
permits that should be closely observed; when firms invest to clean up their plants, bankable 
permits may have a greater negative impact than previously thought.  Notice that this 
overinvestment is observed even though firms are not competing in the marketplace on price or 
faced with nonlinear returns to scale.  
Certain Decline  
Unlike the previous treatments, in the two treatments with declining permits banking can 
(and indeed should) occur in equilibrium.  In particular, subjects should bank enough permits to 
keep the price constant over time.  In this treatment, however, we again saw overbanking (as 
seen in Table 2 when equilibrium prices fall between periods 2 and 3 rather than staying 
constant).  As before, this overbanking caused low trading efficiencies when firms saved their 
permits instead of trading them (t-tests and Wilcoxon tests show that trading efficiency is 
significantly lower than the baseline and the banking treatment but not significantly different 
from the banking and investment treatment).  However, productive efficiencies were reasonable 
in this treatment and not significantly different as compared to other treatments, suggesting that 
production was primarily done by the cleanest firms. 
<Table 6 about here>   22 
These results suggest that having the permits issued decline over time in a known fashion 
will not harm productive efficiency and will harm trading efficiency only in as much as we 
observe superoptimal banking. 
Uncertain Decline 
Table 7 shows results from the uncertain declining treatment, they are quite similar to 
those in certain decline.  Subjects exhibt overbanking, but not as much as in the banking 
treatment.  Trading efficiencies were low due to this problem (significantly lower than the 
baseline and the banking treatment, but not different from the banking and investment and the 
certain decline treatment), but production efficiencies were high (though not significantly higher 
than the other treatments). These results suggest that having the permits issued decline over time 
in a unknown fashion is not significantly different than having them decline in a known manner, 
although both hurt trading efficiency their effects on productive efficiency are minimal. 
<Table 7 about here> 
Table 8 presents results from simple ordinary least squares regression models that pool 
the data across all treatments and compare average prices (relative to price benchmarks in 
individual treatments), trading and productive efficiency. The models have four treatment 
dummies and period as the independent variables. The estimates show that trading efficiency is 
lower in all the treatments as compared to the baseline, however productive efficiency is not 
significantly different across the treatments. The pairwise t-tests discussed above also confirm 
this.   The deviation of price from treatment benchmarks is significantly higher in treatments 
with banking, and certain and uncertain decline of permits as compared to the baseline treatment. 
This could be due to subjects not being able to adjust easily to the change in conditions each 
period (for example the number of permits banked in the previous period).   
<Table 8 about here> 
5. Discussion 
This paper uses laboratory evidence to examine the interaction between banking, 
investment, and decline of permits in an emissions trading setting.  We examine price and   23 
efficiency in the different treatments where subjects are allowed to bank permits, invest in 
abatement technology or face uncertainty in permit allocation. We employ the concept of trading 
efficiency (which measures how much of the available surplus from trading is realized in the 
permit market) and productive efficiency (which measures the fraction of output, like electricity, 
produced in the experiments relative to the amount produced in equilibrium) to understand how 
subjects behave in different treatments. This paper also introduces a methodological advance. 
Our results obtained from employing a relatively unusual experimental design, where we 
describe the emissions market in terms of its impact on the production market in order to provide 
a context-free experiment, are largely consistent with results from other experiments.    
We find that in treatments when banking is available, subjects overbank, that is they save 
more permits than they would as compared to theoretical predictions.  When investment in 
cleaning up emissions is possible, subjects overinvest, again leading to cleaner production but 
reduced efficiency. The proportion of permits overbanked is reduced however relative to 
sessions where investment is not possible. When the number of permits available declines over 
time, agents continue to overbank, although less so relative to the equilibrium amount.  
These results are not simply experimentally interesting.  We see similar outcomes in 
actual pollution permit markets.  For example, overbanking of allowances and overinvestment in 
abatement technology have been argued to be some of the reasons for lower allowance prices in 
Phase 1 of the SO2 market (Ellerman  et al. 2000)
8. Regulators in the field are currently creating 
designs to provide the right incentive schemes to discourage overbanking. For example, the 
Ozone Transport Commission in the Eastern U.S. included restrictions on the aggregate level of 
banking (Farrell et al. 1999). In particular, if the total amount of banked emissions by all sources 
exceeds 10 percent of the total allowable emissions for the year, a 2-for-1 discount is applied to 
the use of the extra banked allowances, i.e. value of the banked permits fall. 
                                                 
8 Overinvestment was triggered by among other things, a general underestimation of the extent to which declines in 
rail rates for transporting low-sulfur Western coal would drive down the price of coal and hence reduce the need for 
abatement to meet the Phase I target.   24 
A central result of the paper is that when individuals are given an opportunity to invest in 
abatement technology they can use it more than is optimal. Given that this investment crowds out 
other, potentially more productive investment, this is a somewhat undesirable outcome. The 
results from our experiment show that if firms with low abatement values, decide to invest in 
abatement technology they could (in effect) be spending money to clean up, then need to produce 
in the market to recover these costs, taking production away from cleaner firms.  This could be 
socially suboptimal. An additional reason why individuals could be overinvesting in this 
experiment is that the investment decision is public information. There could therefore be some 
peer group influence being exerted in the experiment, with individual firms overestimating the 
impact of investment. Since the emissions market itself is the central motivator of the control 
equipment investment decision, it seems clear that we need a deeper understanding of how the 
market institutions affect these investment decisions.  
Future research in this area could, for example, use information as a treatment variable to 
examine if individuals are more willing to adopt new technology when they see others adopting 
it.  Information about others’ abatement decisions could be guiding investment decisions, even in 
situations where there is no uncertainty. Including the issue of uncertainty in this framework 
would make this more of a problem, with individuals thinking of other’s investment decisions as 
signals that the regulations are going to tighten and that permits would decline soon. This 
interaction between investment, banking, uncertainty and information would be interesting to 
explore.   
  In summary, this paper makes a number of contributions.  Methodologically, we develop 
a simpler mechanism for use in emissions trading experiments. In our baseline condition we 
replicate results from previous experiments using this simpler mechanism.  Substantively, we 
explore the impact of a series of market institutions on efficiency, including banking of permits, 
investment in emissions abatement technology and declining permit allocations.   This 
investigation illuminates both theoretically interesting and practically relevant issues in market 
design and implementation.   25 
Table 1:  Experimental Parameters 
 







































































when investment  55 units  66 units  70 units  80 units  81 units  72 units 
 
*number of units of electricity which can be produced by using up one permit (releasing the 
amount of pollution allowed by one permit), all units assumed to be sold at the market price of 
$1. 
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Table 2:  Equilibrium Predictions in the Treatments 
 
Baseline Banking Banking & Investment Certain Decline Uncertain Decline
Number of Players 36 33 28 31 40
Number of Permits 126 116, 172, 219, 258, 270, 256 102, 146, 151, 156, 165, 170 111, 153, 175, 176, 182 138, 193, 216, 190, 200
Benchmark (eq) quantity 90 79-85, 70-77, 44-81, 34-45, 37-44, 51-54 71-73, 44-51, 52-56, 49-54, 40-45, 44-45 71-81, 74-77, 64-75, 50-70, 47-69 95-99, 76-95, 94-97, 86-90, 70-83
Benchmark (eq) price $7-$8 $7, $6, $6, $6, $6, $6 $8, $8, $8, $8, $8, $8 $7, $7, $6, $6, $6 $7, $7, $7, $7, $7
Benchmark (eq) trading efficiency  270 249, 197, 147, 61, 53, 88 205, 169, 204, 180, 147, 147 225, 194, 136, 118, 114 285, 210, 228, 179, 166
Benchmark productive efficiency (0) 1110 585, 646, 715, 931, 1119, 1868 627, 531, 699, 659, 1272 781, 773, 949, 829, 1418
Benchmark productive efficiency (1) 529, 905, 905, 873, 905, 1217
Benchmark productive efficiency (2) 529, 973, 978, 942, 978, 1592
Benchmark productive efficiency (0) # of units of electricity which could have been produced given # of permits used
Benchmark productive efficiency (1) # of units of electricity which could have been produced given # of permits used with optimal investment
Benchmark productive efficiency (2) # of units of electricity which could have been produced given # of permits used with observed investment 
Table 3:  Results from Baseline Treatment 
 
1234 A v g
Average Price $8.25 $7.82 $7.75 $8.32 $8.04
Quantity 63 67 77 75 70.50
Trading Surplus Earned 150 186 207 213 189
% Trading Efficiency 56% 69% 77% 79% 70%
Units Output Produced 981 1026 1054 1053 1029
% Productive Efficiency 88% 92% 95% 95% 93%  
  












1 (cleanest) 2 3 4 5 6 (dirtiest)
Type of Firm
Optimal Baseline Banking Banking & Investment Decline Known Decline Unknown 
Table 4:  Results from Banking Treatment 
 
123456 A v g
Average Price $8.14 $8.31 $8.13 $7.84 $7.20 $5.43 $7.51
Quantity 83 70 92 97 70 70 80.33
# Permits Used 60 69 77 104 130 249 114.83
# Permits Banked 56 103 142 154 140 7 100.33
Trading Surplus Earned (1) 200 198 290 246 151 59 190.67
% Trading Efficiency 80% 101% 197% 403% 285% 67% 189%
Trading Surplus Earned (2) 100 -48 -231 -252 -104 8 -87.83
% Trading Efficiency 40% -24% -157% -413% -196% 9% -124%
Trading Surplus Earned (3) 150 92 65 51 40 43 73.50
% Trading Efficiency 60% 47% 44% 84% 75% 49% 60%
Units Output Produced 535 638 701 915 1098 1838 954.17
% Productive Efficiency 91% 99% 98% 98% 98% 98% 97%   
Table 5:  Results from Banking and Investment Treatment 
 
123456 A v g
Average Price $6.99 $8.67 $9.44 $9.39 $9.16 $8.31 $8.66
Quantity 74 52 57 66 61 50 60.00
# Permits Used 58 97 97 93 97 168 101.67
# Permits Banked 44 49 54 63 68 2 46.67
Trading Surplus Earned (3) 142 32 51 17 10 102 59.00
% Trading Efficiency 69% 19% 25% 9% 7% 69% 33%
Units Output Produced 509 912 932 920 962 1571 967.67
% Productive Efficiency (1) 96% 101% 103% 105% 106% 129% 107%
% PE (1)- Opt. Inv. costs 36% 101% 103% 105% 106% 129% 97%
% Productive Efficiency (2) 96% 94% 95% 98% 98% 99% 97%
% PE (2)- Act. Inv. costs -131% 86% 95% 89% 98% 99% 56%  
 
  
Table 6:  Results from Certain Decline Treatment 
 
12345 A v g
Average Price $7.75 $8.41 $8.42 $8.37 $8.17 $8.22
Quantity 66 71 65 51 80 66.60
# Permits Used 69 57 78 73 157 86.80
# Permits Banked 42 96 97 103 25 72.60
Trading Surplus Earned (3) 100 49 33 26 34 48.40
% Trading Efficiency 44% 25% 24% 22% 30% 29%
Units Output Produced 545 508 657 619 1257 717.20
% Productive Efficiency 87% 96% 94% 94% 99% 94%  
  
Table 7:  Results from Uncertain Decline Treatment 
 
12345 A v g
Average Price $7.33 $8.00 $8.13 $8.25 $8.17 $7.98
Quantity 88 74 113 66 69 82.00
# Permits Used 84 83 105 90 168 106.00
# Permits Banked 54 110 111 100 32 81.40
Trading Surplus Earned (3) 176 38 81 62 82 87.80
% Trading Efficiency 62% 18% 36% 35% 49% 40%
Units Output Produced 724 683 935 811 1332 897.00
% Productive Efficiency 93% 88% 99% 98% 94% 94%   
 
 
Table 8:  Comparing Price Deviations and Efficiency Measures across Treatments 
 










Banking Treatment  1.036^  
(0.063) 
-10.533 
(0.244)     
-6.367 
(0.617) 
























Observations 26 26 26 
R-squared 0.393  0.461  0.285 
^: p<.10; **: p<.01. 
Trading Efficiency is calculated using the definition of Trading Surplus Earned (3). 
Productive Efficiency for the Banking and Investment treatment uses the PE(2)-Act Inv.costs 
definition.   
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Appendix A:  Optimal Investment Decisions 
Claim:  in equilibrium only type 4 invests, types 1, 2 and 3 do not invest and produce (as much 
as possible) while types 5 & 6 do not invest and sell their permits. 
 
This yields the following market characteristics for a market with one of each type of firm. 
 
1 firm who was type 4, now type 0, with permit value of $10,capacity of 8 permits and 
endowment of 4 permits 
1 firm of type 1 with permit value of $10, capacity of 5 permits and endowment of 1 permit 
1 firm of type 2 with permit value of $9, capacity of 7 permits and endowment of 2 permits 
1 firm of type 3 with permit value of $8, capacity of 9 permits and endowment of 3 permits 
1 firm of type 5 with permit value of $6, capacity of 13 permits and endowment of 5 permits 
1 firm of type 6 with permit value of $5, capacity of 15 permits and endowment of 6 permits 
 
The supply and demand for permits is thus now: 
 
Price Demand  Supply 
10 8    16 
9 13    14 
8 19    11 
7 19    11 
6 27    6 
5 38    0 
 
The equilibrium prediction is thus that permits sell for between $8 and $9 in each period.   
 
Now we check for deviations from this proposed equilibrium. 
 
First, type 1 does not want to invest.  If type 1 invests, even if his investment left the market 
price unchanged, his profits would increase from $18 (buying 4 permits at $8 and using 
them plus his 1 endowment to generate 5 units of electricity worth $10) to $23 (buying 4 
permits at $8 and using them plus his one endowment to generate 5 units of electricity 
worth $11).  Thus investing earns an extra $5 per period, over an expected 5 periods not 
enough to recoup the fixed cost of $80. 
 
Second, type 2 does not want to invest for the same reason.  If type 2 invests, even if his 
investment left the market price unchanged, his profits increase from $23 (buying 5 
permits at $8 and using them plus his 2 endowment to generate 7 units of electricity 
worth $9) to $34 (buying 4 permits at $8 and using them plus his 2 endowment to 
generate 6 units of electricity worth $11).  Thus investing earns an extra $11 per period, 
over an expected 5 periods not enough to recoup the fixed cost of $80 
 
Third, type 3 does not want to invest.  If he invests the price increases to $9 per unit, thus his 
profits increase from $24 (buying 6 permits at $8 and using them plus his 3 endowment 
to generate 9 units of electricity worth $8) to $34 (buying 4 permits at $9 and using them 
plus his 3 endowment to generate 7 units of electricity worth $10).  Thus investing earns  
an extra $10 per period, over an expected 5 periods is not enough to recoup the fixed cost 
of $80.   
 
Fourth, type 4 does not want to reverse his investment.  If he does so, the price remains at 8, but 
his profits decrease from $48 per period (8 units produced at $10 per unit minus 4 units 
bought at $8 per unit) to $21 per period (11 units produced at $7 per unit minus 7 units 
bought at $8 per unit).  Over an expected 5 periods he thus loses $135; significantly more 
than the $80 investment cost.   
 
Fifthly, type 5 does not want to invest.  Type 5 was selling his 5 permits at $8 earning $40 per 
period.  If he invests the price increases to $9 per unit and he becomes a net buyer of 
permits, buying 4 permits at $9 and producing with those plus his endowed 5 permits, 
earning $9 times 9 permits, $81 per period minus $36 for purchasing the permits = $45 
per period  Thus type 5 earns an extra $5 per period for investing, over an expected 5 
periods; not enough to recoup the fixed cost of $80. 
 
Finally, type 6 does not want to invest.  Type 6 was selling his 6 permits at $8 earning $48 per 
period.  If he invests, the price increases to $9 per unit and he becomes a net buyer of 
permits, buying 2 permits at $9 and producing with those plus his endowed 6 permits, 
earning $9 times 8 permits, $72 minus $18 for permit purchases = $54 per period.  Thus 
type 6 earns an extra $6 per period for investing, over an expected 5 periods not enough 
to recoup the fixed cost of $80. 
 